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THE DEMISE OF CLARITY IN CORPORATE
TAKEOVER JURISPRUDENCE: THE
OMNICARE V. NCS HEALTHCARE

ANOMALY

DANIEL VINISH"

INTRODUCTION

The inception of case law governing duties owed by the board
of directors to shareholders in the face of business combinations
was clearly defined by Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.1 in 1985.2
Over the eight years following this case, the Delaware Supreme
Court clarified its position by defining the specific situations
invoking Unocal's enhanced judicial scrutiny and the applicable
standards imposed for reviewing board decisions in such
situations. 3 In 1995, the final guiding light was decided by the
Delaware Supreme Court, solidifying an analysis consonant with
the historical conflict between the self-interest of directors and
the desire of shareholders for return on investment. 4 Recently,
*Daniel E. Vinish. Juris Doctor from St. John's University School of Law July 2006.
Bachelor of Science in Financial Economics from Binghamton University July 2003.
1 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
2 See id. at 955 (holding defensive board action must not be draconian and must be
within range of reasonableness); see also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107,
110 (Del. 1952) (explaining that entire fairness test required directors to bear burden of
establishing entire fairness when they stood on both sides of transactions).
3 See Michal Barzuza, Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 127, 190-97 (2004) (discussing growth of shareholder protection in
Delaware corporate law); see also Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Life and Adventures of Unocal
- Part I: Moore the Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85, 104-43 (1998) (reviewing court's
application of business judgment rule, entire fairness test, and Unocal test following
Unocal).
4 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (clarifying
approach outlined in Unocal); see also Michael B. Regan, Note, Dead End: Delaware's
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however, in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.5 The
Delaware Supreme Court destroyed the prior lucidity in case law
governing corporate directors by holding, first, that an amalgam
of stockholder and director action may be taken into account for
enhanced judicial scrutiny purposes 6 and, second, that the
equivalent of a third requirement, in the form of a fiduciary out,
would now be imposed on director action prior to invocation of
7
Revlon duties.
In Omnicare, the defendants, NCS Healthcare, Inc.
(hereinafter "NCS") and Genesis Health Ventures, Inc.
(hereinafter "Genesis"), were two corporations who had, prior to
the lawsuit, entered into a highly locked up merger agreement. 8
NCS, at the time in question, was a Delaware corporation
engaged in providing pharmaceutical services to long term health
care institutions. 9 Before entering into the merger agreement
with Genesis, NCS's financial condition had been steadily
declining, such that NCS was facing an almost inevitable
bankruptcy.1 0 NCS directors were aware of the company's dire
financial position and, with intentions of protecting the
investments of debt and equity holders of NCS, obtained outside
assistance to canvass the market for possible acquirers or

Response to the Recent Innovation in Corporate Antitakeover Measures, the So-Called
"DeadHand" Poison Pill, in Carmdody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 44 VILL. L. REV. 643, 651-53
(1999) (describing Delaware Supreme Court's re-articulation of Unocal standard in
Unitrin).
5 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
6 See id. at 936 (describing why stockholder and board action could not withstand
Unocal's standard of review requiring enhanced judicial scrutiny); William J. Carney &
Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protectionsof the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
179, 217 (2003) (articulating Omnicare's expansion of Unocal test's scope of review).
7 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936 (explaining why, in addition to being preclusive and
coercive, omission of fiduciary out clause prevented board from fulfilling fiduciary
responsibility to minority shareholders); Carney & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 217
(describing Omnicare's clarification "that a 'preclusive or coercive' examination was not
the end of Unocal scrutiny").
8 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925 (outlining demands upon shareholders by terms of
merger agreement); Carney & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 217 (discussing Omnicare
scrutiny of voting agreement received under Unocal).
9 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 918 (introducing NCS as long term health care provider);
Christopher J. Moceri, Comment, M&A Lockups: Broadly Applying the Omnicare Decision
to Require Fiduciary Outs in all Merger Agreements, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1157, 1161
(2004) (noting that NCS was Delaware corporation specializing in long term health care).
10 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920 (specifying that adverse market conditions led to
NCS's difficulty in collecting accounts receivable and decline in market value of its stock);
Moceri, supra note 9, at 1161 (noting NCS's "financial difficulty").
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investors.'1 After surveying the market through the use of two
different financial advisors over nearly two years time, NCS had
not received a single adequate offer.12 However, at around the
two year mark in its search, NCS contacted Omnicare, Inc.
(hereinafter "Omnicare") and began discussions for an
acquisition of NCS by Omnicare. 13 These discussions soon
terminated due to Omnicare's insistence upon, and NCS's refusal
to allow for, structuring the deal as an asset sale in
bankruptcy.14 At such point, NCS began discussions with
Genesis for a transaction outside of bankruptcy that would grant
moderate, yet enticing, relief for NCS's concerned debt and
equity holders.15 During these discussions, Genesis demanded, as
a precaution stemming from recent historical bidding wars
Genesis had been party to, an exclusive negotiation period, to
which NCS agreed. 1 6 Before Genesis and NCS could enter into a
definitive merger agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"), however,
Omnicare returned to the picture and proposed a financially
attractive, yet otherwise unattractive, bid for NCS.17 Eying the
unattractive nature of Omnicare's bid, the NCS directors
unanimously approved a merger with Genesis and entered into a
11 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920 (stating that NCS retained UBS Warburg in
February of 2000 to identify potential acquirers); see also Andrew D. Arons, Comment, In
Defense of Defensive Devices: How Delaware Discouraged Preventive Measures in
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 3 DEPAUL Bus. & CoMM. L.J. 105, 107 (2004) (explaining
advisory relationship between NCS and UBS Warburg).
12 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 921 (Del. 2003) (finding
that in December of 2000, NCS terminated its relationship with UBS Warburg and
appointed Brown, Gibbons, Lang & Co. as its exclusive financial advisor); see also Arons,
supra note 11, at 107 (noting that while it retained UBS Warburg, NCS received only one
unsatisfactory merger offer).
13 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921 (stating that Omnicare began discussing possible
merger details with Brown, Gibbons in summer 2001); see also Arons, supra note 11, at
108 (noting that NCS contacted Omnicare to discuss possible sale of NCS).
14 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921 (finding that Omnicare made number of merger
proposals to NCS, but all included sale in bankruptcy); see also Arons, supra note 11, at
107-08 (discussing Omnicare's several proposals for NCS's asset sale in bankruptcy).
15 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 922 (discussing Genesis's proposal that provided
possibility of recovery for NCS noteholders and stockholders); see also Arons, supra note
11, at 108 (noting that in January 2002, NCS contacted Genesis to discuss potential
merger).
16 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 922-23 (discussing demands by Genesis for exclusivity);
see also Arons, supra note 11, at 109 ("Genesis absolutely refused to continue to work
towards closing the agreement unless NCS agreed to act on an exclusive basis with
Genesis.").
17 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 924 (outlining renewed proposal by Omnicare stating
that Omnicare would retire NCS's senior and subordinated debt and offering NCS
stockholders $3.00/share); see also Arons, supra note 11, at 110 (discussing new Omnicare
proposal for acquisition outside of bankruptcy).
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definitive merger agreement,i 8 including: a no shop clause, that
prevented NCS from entering into discussions with other parties
unless certain preconditions were met;19 a "force-the-vote"
provision requiring, regardless of continued NCS board
recommendation of the merger, enforcement of § 251(c) 20 and,
consequently, a shareholder vote on the merger; 2 1 and voting
agreements, drafted separate from the Agreement, pledging a
majority of NCS's outstanding voting shares in favor of the
merger. 2 2 Omnicare, fearing the potential loss it would incur in
market share if the Agreement was fully consummated,
irrevocably committed itself to a hostile offer paying in excess of
the value NCS equity holders were to receive under the

18 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 924-25 (Del. 2003). NCS
executives viewed Omnicare's insistence upon due diligence review as substantially
undercutting the value of Omnicare's offer. The board believed the risk of losing Genesis's
offer was too great to pursue Omnicare's offer, given Omnicare's prior rock solid
negotiating position requiring an asset sale in bankruptcy along with its decision to
secretly deal exclusively with the Ad Hoc Committee. Id. at 924-25. Ultimately, NCS
agreed to the merger with Genesis. See also Arons, supra note 11, at 111.
19 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925. The 'no shop' clause stated verbatim:
NCS would not enter into discussions with third parties concerning an alternative
acquisition of NCS, or provide non-public information to such parties, unless (1) the third
party provided an unsolicited, bona fide written proposal documenting the terms of the
acquisition; (2) the NCS board believed in good faith that the proposal was or was likely to
result in an acquisition on terms superior to those contemplated by the NCS/Genesis
merger agreement; and (3) before providing non-public information to that third party,
the third party would execute a confidentiality agreement at least as restrictive as the one
in place between NCS and Genesis.
Id. at 925-26.
20 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2005) (regarding procedural rules of merger votes).
21 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925. The NCS/Genesis merger agreement read, "NCS
would submit the merger agreement to NCS stockholders regardless of whether the NCS
board continued to recommend the merger." Id. A recent amendment to the Delaware
General Corporation Law permitted the "force-the-vote" provision. See E. Norman Veasey
& Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and
Governance from 1999-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1399, 1458 (2005).
22 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 926. Jon H. Outcalt, Chairman of the NCS board of
directors, held 202,063 shares of class A common stock and 3,476,086 shares of class B
common stock. Id. at 918. Kevin B. Shaw, President, CEO, and a director of NCS, held
28,905 shares of class A common stock and 1,141,134 shares of class B common stock. Id.
at 919. Outcalt and Shaw entered into voting agreements expressly in their capacity as
stockholders and not as directors or officers. Id. at 926. The voting agreements required
Outcalt and Shaw vote their shares in favor of merger and were specifically enforceable
by Genesis. Id. The voting agreements contained many requirements. See also Kurt M.
Heyman & Christal Lint, Recent Developments in CorporateLaw: Recent Supreme Court
Reversals and the Role of Equity in Corporate Jurisprudence,6 DEL. L. REV. 451, 468
(2003) for list of requirements set forth in voting agreements.
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Agreement. 2 3 NCS, however, was prevented from changing its
future course. 24 Sails had been set.
Delaware Supreme Court Justice Holland, writing for the
majority of a divided court, 2 5 began his analysis by deeming "not
outcome determinative" 26 a resolution of the applicable standard
of review. 2 7 He then termed the issue of the case as whether the
defensive tactics used by NCS to 'lock up' its deal with Genesis
were congruous with the board's fiduciary duties. 28 After
surveying the law, Justice Holland proceeded to delineate two
holdings for the court. 29 First, the Court held that actions by the
NCS board to protect its merger with Genesis were preclusive
and coercive, in violation of the duties imposed by Unocal30 and,
23 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 927. Omnicare irrevocably committed itself to a
transaction with NCS, paying $3.50 for each share of NCS class A and class B common
stock. Id. See also Heyman & Lint, supra note 22, at 469 for discussion of Omnicare's
offer.
24 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 926-27 (Del. 2003). As a
result of Omnicare's offer, NCS's board withdrew its recommendation for the stockholders
to vote in favor of the NCS/Genesis merger. Id. NCS's financial advisor also withdrew his
fairness opinion of the NCS/Genesis merger agreement. Id. at 927. These were fruitless
acts, howe.er, because the combined effect of the NCS/Genesis merger provision requiring
the NCS stockholders vote on the NCS/Genesis merger regardless of board approval,
along with the voting agreements granted by Outcalt and Shaw, made the NCS/Genesis
merger an agreed upon pre-determined conclusion. Id. One author described the merger
provision and the voting agreements as rendering "moot" any merger talks other than
those between NCS and Genesis. See Jay. H. Knight, Merger Agreements Post-Omnicare,
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.: How the Delaware Supreme Court Pulled a Plug on
"MathematicalLock-Ups", 31 N. Ky. L. REV. 29, 44 (2004).
25 See Chiappinelli, supra note 3, at 101 n.90 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's
history with respect to overruling recent case law); see also Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra
note 21, at 1458 (stating that Omnicare decision was controversial in part because it
involved rare split decision by normally unanimous Delaware Supreme Court).
26 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 929 (discussing effect on this appeal of Court of Chancery's
standard of review).
27 See id. The Court's decision not to make an affirmative determination of whether
Revlon or Unocal duties applied has the effect of deeming as a third prong to the Unocal
test the requirement of a fiduciary out. See id. The test for board action in the face of a
business combination was laid out in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985). The Court of Chancery believed Revlon duties were inapplicable to the
NCS/Genesis/Omnicare situation. See generally In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., 825 A.2d 240,
254-56 (Del. Ch. 2002).
28 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930 (explaining that Delaware law requires "balance of
power" between boards and stockholders); see also Knight, supra note 24, at 48
(describing challenged deal protection measures as locking in NCS/Genesis merger).
29 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936 (maintaining that court's decision was two-fold in
nature and was based upon both proposition that board's actions were preclusive and
coercive and also upon notion that overall terms of merger formulated a "fait accompli").
30 See id. (holding that board's actions essentially robbed stockholders of vote because
there was already predetermined outcome by time vote was to be taken); see also Unitrin
v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (defining preclusive and coercive
within Unocal).
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therefore, invalid and unenforceable. 3 1 The Court reached this
holding by deeming a unitary response the combination of the
NCS board's choice to include a force-the-shareholder-vote
provision in the merger agreement and the NCS majority
shareholders' decision to grant specifically enforceable voting
agreements to Genesis. 3 2 Second, the Court held a target is
prohibited, regardless of the applicable duty given a proposed
merger's structure, from agreeing to a merger on terms that
formulate "a fait accompli" and prevent it from accepting a
higher valued bid.33

Delaware Supreme Court Justice Veasey led the divided court's
dissent, disagreeing sharply with the majority's analysis of
Unocal and its progeny, 34 as well as the majority's blanket
fiduciary out requirement. 3 5 Justice Veasey began his dissent
arguing, with regard to the majority's Unocal analysis, that by
holding the NCS board's action to be preclusive and coercive, the
majority misapplied the principles of "draconian" action outlined
in Unitrin.36 To support this view, he emphasized that, unlike
the majority opinion, the focus in Unitrin was on the coercive or
preclusive effect actions taken by the board had on the outcome
of a shareholder vote. 3 7 Concluding his dissent, Justice Veasey
31 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936 (positing that predetermined nature of vote was
impermissible coercion and therefore "cannot withstand Unocal's enhanced judicial
scrutiny standard of review," because it is not "within the range of reasonableness").
32 See id. at 934-36 (concluding that board's actions constituted unitary response and
therefore should be reviewed under Unocal which states "if defensive measures are either
preclusive or coercive they are draconian and impermissible" and extrapolating that in
this case, because protection devices of NCS board were both preclusive and coercive, they
were undoubtedly impermissible).
33 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003) (finding
that merger's terms accomplished a fait accompli because even though stockholders were
not forced to vote for merger, they were required to accept it).
34 See id. at 944-45 (Veasey, J., dissenting) (positing that majority misapplied "the
Unitrin concept of 'coercive and preclusive"' and therefore used it incorrectly to advance
its analysis and highlighting differences between Unitrin cases and NCS board's actions).
35 See id. at 946 (Veasey, J., dissenting) (distinguishing reasoning in QVC
surrounding fiduciary out requirement that did not "create a special duty to protect the
minority stockholders from the consequences of a controlling stockholder's ultimate
decisions unless the controlling stockholder stands on both sides of the transaction" from
Omnicare facts).
36 See id. at 943-44 (Veasey, J., dissenting) (noting that draconian measures in
Unitrin dealt with unilateral board action and explaining that by misapplying concept of
"coercive and preclusive" in this case, the majority preempted proper proportionality
balancing).
37 See id. at 944 (Veasey, J., dissenting) ("The proper inquiry in this case is whether
the NCS board had taken actions that 'have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote
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pointed out that no case ever decided by the Delaware Supreme
Court supported the majority's blanket fiduciary
out
requirement, 38
distinguishing
the
majority's
supporting
precedent on its facts. 3 9
It is submitted that, in holding Unitrin's language allowing
inextricably related board actions to be reviewed as a unitary
response to reach both board and shareholder action, the
Delaware Supreme Court erred in its application of pre-Revlon
enhanced judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, it is submitted that, in
holding as a blanket rule regardless of the circumstances that a
fiduciary out must exist in all merger agreements, the Delaware
Supreme Court erred in its analysis of the fiduciary duty owed by
directors to shareholders.
Moreover, both aforementioned
holdings ignore the board's fundamental role in determining,
absent the fiduciary duty shift initiated by Revlon, the
corporation's long term profit seeking strategy and thus disable
the board from adequately and effectively running the
corporation.
Part I of this comment will provide an overview of the
distribution of power between shareholders and the board of
directors as well as an indication of why enhanced judicial
scrutiny is required in certain circumstances. Part II will explain
in depth relevant Delaware case law in addition to the various
duties imposed on directors by this case law. Part III will
juxtapose Delaware case law discussing preclusive and coercive
action with the NCS board's actions to illustrate how the court's
holding in Omnicare is neither consistent with prior applications
in favor of the proposed transaction for some reason other than the merits of that
transaction."').
38 See id. at 945 (Veasey, J., dissenting) ("We know of no authority in our
jurisprudence supporting this new rule,..."); Heyman & Lint, supra note 22, at 474
(highlighting that Justice Veasey pointed out that there was no authority in Delaware
jurisprudence supporting this rule).
39 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 946 (Del. 2003) (Veasey,
J., dissenting). Justice Veasey stated:
[t]he Majority relies on our decision in QVC to assert that the board's fiduciary duties
prevent the directors from negotiating a merger agreement without providing an
escape provision. Reliance on QVC for this proposition, however, confuses our
statement of a board's responsibilities when the directors confront a superior
transaction and turn away from it to lock up a less valuable deal with the very
different situation here, where the board committed itself to the only value-enhancing
transaction available.
Id. Veasey also points to the contrast between the board in QVC and the NCS board in
Omnicare. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 21, at 1460 n.248.
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of preclusive and coercive nor consistent with the theory
underlying the Unocal-Revlon framework's multilevel enhanced
judicial scrutiny analysis.
I. DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER BETWEEN THE SHAREHOLDERS AND
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The correct distribution of power between the shareholders and
4
board has, throughout time, been an issue of much debate. 0
Statutorily, the board of directors of a public corporation is
generally empowered with the ability to conduct and direct the
business and affairs of the corporation. 4 1 Consequently,
shareholders are at the mercy of the board on a day to day
basis. 42 It is, therefore, of utmost importance for a business,
when deciding where to incorporate, to consider a jurisdiction's
statutory distribution of power, as not all jurisdictions provide
shareholders the same rights. 4 3 The following commentary on
Delaware's statutory allocation of power is meant to illustrate
the framework governing NCS, a Delaware corporation.
Title Eight of the Delaware Code Annotated ("Title Eight")44
defines the law governing Delaware corporations and delineates
40 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 837 n.5 (2005) (explaining that corporation's board is responsible for
managing its business and affairs); see also R. Mathew Garms, Note, ShareholderBy-Law
Amendments and the Poison Pill: The Market for Corporate Control and Economic
Efficiency, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 433, 434-35 (1999) (describing historical tension over
distribution of power between shareholders and directors); see also E. Norman Veasey,
The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 403 (1997)
(describing tension between deference to business judgment and judicial review).
41 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2005) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the directors of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate
of incorporation."); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (noting
that under Delaware law business and affairs of Delaware corporations are managed by
or under its board).
42 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (discussing power held by
boards with regard to demand in derivative suits); see also Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of

The Corporate Attorney Within The Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J.

CORP. L. 943, 947 (1996) ("Under Delaware corporation law, the officers of the corporation
run the day-to-day operations of the company, with the oversight of the board of
directors.").
43 Compare N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 505 (2005) (requiring shareholder vote to authorize
share-purchase options to directors, officers and employees of corporation), with DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2005) (authorizing board of directors to by resolution designate
officers who may allocate stock options to officers and employees of the corporation
without shareholder approval).
44 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2005) (containing Delaware General Corporation Law in
Chapter One).
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power among voting shareholders and directors.45 Specifically,
voting shareholders are granted eight distinct fundamental,
inalienable rights.46 This group of fundamental powers can be
summarized generally into three categories: creation and
destruction of internal documents; determination of directors;
and fundamental alteration the corporate existence.
The power to amend and adopt a corporations internal
documents, including the by-laws and certificate of incorporation,
is granted to the shareholders under Delaware Code §§ 10947 and
242.48 The Certificate of Incorporation, unlike the by-laws, is a
publicly filed document and, therefore, is generally limited to
containing only that which is required by § 242.49 The by-laws,
on the other hand, are permitted to be kept private and thus
generally contain all of the corporation's internal governance
rules not required by § 242 to be stated in the Certificate of
Incorporation. 5 0 Power to control the contents of these
45 See id. Various provisions of Title 8 provide for shareholder voting rights, as well
as those powers which are reserved to the board of directors and can be exercised without
shareholder approval.
Id. The Delaware jurisprudence relating to this issue was
discussed in Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-60 (Del. Ch. 1988).
46 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2005) (regulating adoption and amendment of
bylaws); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (regulating amendment of certificate of
incorporation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (regulating election and removal of directors);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (regulating mergers and consolidations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 271 (regulating sale of assets); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (regulating dissolution);
Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., No. 117791, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at
*34 (Del. Ch. 1991) ('That those rights are fundamental does not mean that their exercise
cannot be restricted for valid corporate purposes by board-created procedural rules.
However, those restrictions must not infringe upon the exercise of those rights in an
unreasonable way."); see also Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658-63 (holding shareholders' right to
elect directors cannot be taken away).
47 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (vesting this power solely with shareholders once
corporation has received any payment for its stock); see also Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674
A.2d 483, 492 (Del. Ch. 1995) (describing this allocation of power).
48 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2005) (allowing shareholders to vote on proposed
amendments affecting corporations' certificate of incorporation); Paramount Commc'ns v.
QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) ("Under the statutory framework of the
General Corporation Law [including § 242], many of the most fundamental corporate
changes can be implemented only if they are approved by a majority vote of the
stockholders.").
49 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2005) (delineating items that may be amended by
shareholder vote); Farahpour v. DCX, Inc., 635 A.2d 894, 897 (Del. 1994) (citing items
regarding certificate of incorporation amendable through shareholder vote).
50 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2005) ('The bylaws may contain any provision,
not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business
of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or
powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees."); Chandler, Chancellor,
Unreported Case: Di Loreto v. Tiber Holding Corp.: No. 16,564, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 456,
467 n.12 (2000) (explaining statute's few limitations regarding what shareholders may
enact for corporation's by-laws).
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documents, therefore, enables the shareholders to prohibit the
board of directors from changing the structure of and rules
governing the board and the corporation in general.D1
Consequently, directors, whose interests are not always in line
with that of the shareholders, are, at least in part, stymied from
preventing corporate attainment of the shareholders' primary
goal: return on investment.52
Consonant with the shareholder right to amend and adopt the
certificate of incorporation and by-laws is the shareholder right
to both elect and remove directors from office.5 3 In short, the
54
shareholders right to control director positions is near absolute.
Some limitations do, however, exist.5 5 The right to elect directors
is slightly limited, depriving shareholders only of the right to fill
untimely vacancies and newly created positions.5 6 Alternatively,
the right to remove directors may in certain circumstances, as
per the bylaws, be limited to a greater degree, such as requiring
shareholders to show cause before removing directors.5 7
51 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2005) (establishing limited methods of major
corporate change whereby only stockholder vote can finalize decision); Paramount, 637
A.2d at 42 (fermenting general policy set forth by General Corporation Law in Delaware
that fundamental corporate changes must be approved by majority of stockholders).
52 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 315-16 (1999) (describing directors' incentive to maximize
returns for their own benefit and that of shareholders in order to retain director
positions); Richard A. Booth, Junk Bonds, the Relevance of Dividends and the Limits of
ManagerialDiscretion, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 553, 553 (1987) (implying shareholders'
primary desire is high return on investment).
53 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2005) (allocating establishment or removal of
board members by shareholders election); Duffy v. Loft, Inc., 152 A. 849, 852 (Del. 1930)
(establishing role of directors as elected positions, chosen at annual shareholder
meetings).
54 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985)
(highlighting shareholders' ability to vote out directors if displeased with their actions);
Brian T. Corrigan, Corporate Governance under Chapter 11: Should Directors Serve
Shareholders, Creditors, and/or the Corporation?, 688 PLI/Comm 9, 49 (1994) ("In
Delaware, shareholders' right to elect directors is 'virtually absolute,' even when the
corporation is insolvent and in a Chapter 11 case."). But see Blair & Stout, supra note 52,
at 310 (contesting nuances that shareholder voting rights give them more than nominal
control over directors).
55 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2005) (limiting power of shareholders in
appropriate circumstances such as inability to remove directors without showing cause);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (2005) (allowing directors to fill temporary vacancies if any
others resign).
56 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (reserving power to fill vacancies for board of
directors); see also Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sales of Control Transactions: Where We
Stand Today, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 248, 269 (1986) (noting boards have power to
temporarily shift control due to its ability to fill vacancies).
57 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2005) (requiring showing of cause by
shareholders before directors may be removed under qualified circumstances); see also
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Rounding out shareholder power is the ability to control
fundamental changes to the corporate enterprise. 58 For directors
to enter the corporation into a merger, 59 to sell substantially all
of the corporation's assets out of the ordinary course of
business, 6 0 or to dissolve the corporation, an affirmative majority
vote representing all outstanding voting shares is required. 6 1
Limited exceptions apply, but it is the general fundamental
change in the corporate enterprise that triggers this right to
vote. 62 Courts and legislatures have recognized shareholders
should not be divested from such decisions, on the idea that
decisions to fundamentally change the corporate enterprise could
potentially stem from myriad reasons disparate with shareholder
interests. 63
Ellen S. Friedenberg, Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments as a
Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32, 41 (1982) (discussing shareholders' inherent
power to remove directors for cause and ability to limit shareholders' right to remove
directors without cause if their charter so provides).
58 See In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., 663 A.2d 1194, 1200, (Del. Ch. 1995)
(explaining how board actions affecting corporate makeup need shareholder approval); see
also Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1994) (stating that "some fundamental
measures require stockholder action" including "all amendments to certificates of
incorporation and mergers").
59 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2005) (requiring merger agreement to be
submitted to shareholders); see also Williams, 671 A.2d at 1381 (explaining how
shareholder approval under section 251 is needed in order for board of directors to go
forward with merger).
60 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (requiring shareholder approval for sale, lease or
exchange of assets); see also J. P. Griffin Holding Corp. v. Mediatrics, Inc., No. 4056, 1973
Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, at *4 (Del. Ch. 1973) (paraphrasing statute in how it governs sale of
Delaware corporations' assets).
61 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (requiring stockholder vote for dissolution); see
also In re Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, No. 5357, 1980 Del. Ch. LEXIS 489, at *11
(Del. Ch. 1980) (explaining Delaware statute as permitting voluntary dissolution when it
is deemed advisable by board and approved by majority of stockholders).
62 See Alexander G. Simpson, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School: Now is the
Winter of Our Discontent, 43 DUKE L. J. 189, 204-05 (1993) (noting that shareholders are
given power to vote on major corporate structural changes but not on mundane daily
activities); see also Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a "New" Interpretationof
the Revlon Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV.
609, 667 (1995) (discussing fundamental changes in corporate structure necessitating
enhanced judicial scrutiny under Revlon); cf. David Cohen, Comment, Valuation in the
Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L. J. 117, 122 (1985) (explaining that short-form
mergers do not require shareholder vote because "result of the vote is obvious").
63 See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the
ShareholderRole: "Sacred Space" in CorporateTakeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 294 (2001)
(discussing director entrenchment in merger situations); see also Donald Lund, Comment,
Toward a Standardfor Third-party Advisor Liability in Mergers and Buy-outs: Schneider
and Beyond, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 603, 603 (1991) (relating that shareholders' right to vote
exists "because a prospective merger or take-over can potentially alter the fundamental
nature of a corporation, or substantially affect the valuable investments of every
shareholder").
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Although shareholder power to govern the corporation extends
across vital grounds, directors retain the power to run the
corporation's everyday activities. 64 Delaware courts have taken
an active role in solidifying this right. 65 Consistently, cases
uphold board action attacked by majority-block shareholders
66
claiming a right to step over the board's managerial discretion.
This treatment is a necessary requirement incident to the
effective functioning of a publicly traded corporation. 6 7 For-profit
corporations must be able to adapt to market conditions in their
day to day transactions to remain competitive and profitable;
having to cope with the impediments inherent in large governing
68
bodies would prevent attainment of efficient competition.
II. GOVERNING LAW
As a result of the board's power to control every day business
and affairs, the law has recognized that, in certain
circumstances, shareholders may require protection against
external competition related sources as well as internal authority
64 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (articulating power of board); Levine v. Smith, 591
A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (explaining how board of directors posses duty to manage
'business and affairs' of corporation and illustrating that determination of whether to
bring derivative suit is within business and affairs' of corporation).
65 See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (expounding upon
protection that business judgment rule provides); A. Mechele Dickerson, Approving
Employee Retention and Severance Programs:Judicial Discretion Run Amuck?, 11 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 93, 100 (2003) (enouncing bounds of managerial discretion protected
by business judgment rule).
66 Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l. Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 349 (Del. Ch. 2004) (deeming
board action to sell 'trophy asset' to be within board's business judgment and not subject
to shareholder consent); see alsoRobert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel Jr., The Economic
Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 93 n.32 (1995)
(noting deferential treatment courts extend to board of director decisions absent fraud or
other misconduct).
67 See Royce de R. Barondes, Dynamic Economic Analyses of Selected Provisions of
CorporateLaw: The Absolute Delegation Rule, Disclosure of Intermediate Estimates and
IPO Pricing, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 97, 115 (1994) (explaining inefficiency that exists in
placing right to vote on 'wide array of business decisions' in widely held group of
stockholders); K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in
CorporateLaw, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1425, 1481-82 (2004) (noting consistency in corporate
decision making to be extremely difficult to achieve when substantial voting power is
placed in shareholders).
68 See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Precommitment and Managerial Incentives:
Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA L. REV. 577, 581
n.13 (2003) (citing authority for increasing board's managerial discretion); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the
Street?, 73 TUL L. REV. 409, 453-57 (1998) (outlining reasons why direct management by
widely dispersed stockholder groups is inefficient).

2006]

THE DEMSE OFCLARITY

figures. 6 9 It is the "omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests," 70 rather than in the
interests of the corporation and shareholders, that prompts
heightened scrutiny when the board acts to defend against
"threats" to the "corporate enterprise." 7 1 Although directors owe
72
at all times to the corporation a duty of care and of loyalty,
depending on a given transaction's characteristics, courts may
73
inflict higher standards of review on a board to meet its duties.
Additionally, the board's duty of loyalty may shift so as to no
longer be owed to the corporation as an entity. 74
A. Delaware Precedent
i. Unocal
Unocal Co., v. Mesa Petroleum Co.75 marks the beginning of
current enhanced judicial scrutiny application. 76 In Unocal, the
board was faced with a highly coercive front-loaded back-end-

69 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (stating that directors are
charged with an "unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders");
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Del. Ch. 1985)
(discussing balancing of internal and external interests corporate directors are faced
with).
70 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (examining
reasons for need of judicial examination of certain board decisions before protections of
business judgment rule can be given).
71 Id. at 957. "If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 955.
72 See id. at 955 (stating that corporate directors have a "fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation's stockholders"); Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 967-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (outlining duty of care owed by directors to
corporation).
73 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (discussing need for judicial examination of certain
board decisions before business judgment rule can be applied); Kerr, supra note 62, at
617-20 (positing Delaware imposes enhanced judicial scrutiny in certain transactions
prior to protection of business judgment rule).
74 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (establishing shift in fiduciary duty from "the preservation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit");
Gary von Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:
Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 461, 476 (1994) (discussing shift in fiduciary duty
that occurs when board action leaves realm of Unocal and enters Revlon).
75 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
76 See id. at 954 (discussing need for heightened judicial scrutiny of certain board
decisions); Kerr, supra note 62, at 617-18 (discussing Unocal and its predecessors as
establishing enhanced judicial scrutiny).
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cash-out tender offer. 77 Financial advisors for Unocal deemed
this hostile tender offer's front end to be far below the liquidation
value of Unocal's stock and the back end to be junk rated. 78 In
response, the Unocal board attempted to remove the hostile
tender offer's coerciveness by initiating a counter self-tender offer
which effectively supplanted an alternative to the hostile offer's
back-end junk bonds. 79 The court upheld as valid both of Unocal's
purposes, to defeat an inadequate hostile offer and to prevent the
back end issuance of junk bonds, in initiating its tender offer in
the face of the coercive hostile offer.8 0 In upholding these
purposes, the court established a new test, applicable prior to
application of business judgment rule protections, for when
corporate boards are placed in the context of a takeover.8 1 First,
directors are required to show they had reasonable grounds for
perceiving a threat to the corporate enterprise.8 2 This can be
83
satisfied by "showing good faith and reasonable investigation,"
of which is materially enhanced when the board is comprised of
outside, independent directors. 84 Directors are further required
to demonstrate their actions were "reasonable in relation to the

77 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-50. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1997 (2000) (describing
attributes of two-tier, front-loaded tender offer).
78 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950-51 (explaining "minimum cash value that could be
expected from a sale or orderly liquidation for 100% of Unocal's stock was in excess of $60
per share" and that back-end of proposal would be financed with "junk bonds"); see also
John C. Anjier, Comment, Anti-Takeover Statutes, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Risk,
51 LA. L. REV. 561, 622 n.174 (1991) (defining Unocal's two-tier front-end, back-end offer).
79 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951 (explaining Unocal's discriminatory self-tender offer
for 49% of Unocal's remaining shareholders upon consummation of Mesa's tender offer);
see also Adam R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives Systemic Risk: Innovative
Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1053 n.209 (1994) (citing
studies alleging junk bond default rate is approximately 34%).
80 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (adopting selective exchange offer, Unocal was
attempting to defeat Mesa's inadequate offer and provide those stockholders who would
otherwise be coerced into accepting junk bonds).
81 See Unocal Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (discussing
newly devised business judgment test).
82 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (explaining proper directorial measures to protect
against inherent conflict); see also Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555-56 (Del. 1964)
(stating reasonable grounds for believing danger exists in corporate policy and
effectiveness must be shown).
83 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d, 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).
84 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995) (holding
presence of mostly outside independent directors materially enhances evidence of
reasonableness); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (proffering that outside independent directors
should have acted according to standards).
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threat posed." 8 5 Considerations involving price terms, nature of
the present market environment, timing and legality of the offer
as well as effects on constituencies, risk of non-consummation
and the quality of securities offered may be reviewed to
determine whether director action fits within the guise of
reasonableness. 8 6 The key aspect of this approach is that
directors, in carrying out their duties, must focus solely on
protecting
the
"corporate enterprise,"
which
includes
preconceived plans for long term financial growth.8 7 Given that
directors are perpetually conflicted between attainment of
personal self-interest and of corporate goals, it is clear why the
Delaware Supreme Court reached the result it did.88
Delaware court decisions subsequent to Unocal intimated the
bounds of its two step test; however, it was not until Unitrin, Inc.
v. American General Corp.89 was decided that the Court outlined
a definitive analysis. 90 The facts of Unitrin involved a situation
analogous to that of Unocal; specifically, a bidder attempting to
acquire, via hostile tender offer, ownership and control of a
target, namely Unitrin. 9 1 In this case, the board employed two
85 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (delineating balance analysis).
86 See Newell Co. v. Vt. Am. Co., 725 F. Supp. 351, 372-73 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(referencing Delaware's method for determining whether there is threat to corporation);
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (providing examples of concerns regarding takeover bids).
87 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1376 (stating, "the directors of a Delaware corporation
have the prerogative to determine that the market undervalues its stock and to protect its
stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long term value of the corporation under
its present management plan."); Unocal Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985) (explaining board must protect corporate enterprise, including stockholders).
88 See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 ("We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the
purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a
threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of
interest, and an objective decision is difficult."); Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh's
Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in
Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 813 n.19 (2003) (explaining that during hostile
takeovers, board members risk losing their jobs, but must still keep interests of
shareholders in mind when an offer is beneficial to those shareholders).
89 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
90 See id. at 1387 (defining "draconian" as preclusive and coercive board action and
delineating tests for determining "preclusive" and "coercive"); see also Paul L. Regan,
Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 96 (1999) (explaining that Unitrin test asks first, whether Board
responses to a hostile takeover are either preclusive or coercive to shareholders, and if
not, whether it was reasonable response).
91 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1368-70 (finding Unitrin board unanimously concluded
the American General's offer was not in the best interests of Unitrin's shareholders); see
also Alexander B. Johnson, FinancialServices Regulation:A Mid-Decade Review: Note: Is
Revlon Only Cosmetic?: Structuringa Merger in the Mid-1990s, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2271,
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defensive strategies, a Rights Plan and a Repurchase Plan, 92 in
addition to a preexisting limitation in Unitrin's certificate of
incorporation on the ability of Unitrin to enter into a business
combination of any making. 9 3 The Court of Chancery concluded
that the above defensive combination had the effect of "chill[ing]
any unsolicited acquiror from making an offer." 9 4 On appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court found the Court of Chancery to have
applied the wrong standard of review and, although the
Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's holding,
remanded the case for application of the correct standard of
review. 9 5 In its directions for remand, the Delaware Supreme
Court, in a less than novel directive, explicated thoroughly what
has become standard Unocal application. 96 To begin, the court
clarified that "inextricably related" defensive actions taken by a
board were to be viewed as a unitary response for Unocal
application purposes. 97 Following this, the Court elucidated a two
step analysis for the second prong of Unocal's test, expanding the
Court's prior prohibition on defensive board action "draconian" in
2274 (1995) (explaining Unitrin Board's repurchase plan was in response to American
General's unsolicited bid).
92 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1370-71. On recommendations by Morgan Stanley,
Unitrin's Board authorized an open stock repurchase plan, allowing the company to
repurchase 1/5 of Unitrin's outstanding common shares. Id.
93 See id. at 1377-78. According to the certificate, a director majority vote, or a
stockholder supermajority vote of 75% was required to approve a takeover. Id.
94 See id. at 1377-78 (finding repurchase plan did more that protect stockholder's
interests and was possibly made to secure director's own positions on the Board).
95 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389 (Del. 1995) (finding
Chancery Court erred in substituting its judgment on the necessity of the Repurchase
program, for the judgment of the Board); see also Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the
Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 IOwA J. CORP. L. 103, 158 (2003)
(explaining on remand, Chancery Court was to determine if Unitrin's responses were
within a "range of reasonableness").
96 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1386-88 (giving case history following Unocal, outlining
steps made in first determining whether Board response is "draconian" and second
whether board responses are founded on reasonable business judgment); see also Ronald
J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L.
491, 506 (2001) (articulating standard on remand, that responses to takeover attempts
must be determined to not make proxy fights 'mathematically impossible" or
"realistically unattainable').
97 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387 (explaining Board's overall response, with
justifications for each action, should be evaluated by the courts); see also Gilbert v. El
Paso Co. 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Del. 1990) ("In assessing the plaintiffs' allegations, we
must evaluate the El Paso directors' overall response to the December offer, including the
justification for each challenged defensive measure, and the results achieved thereby.");
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987) ("Because
Newmont's actions here are so inextricably related, the principles of Unocal require that
they be scrutinized collectively as a unitary response to the perceived threats.").
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nature. 98 Board action now found to be preclusive or coercive
with respect to the stockholder vote violates the second prong;
however, even if not preclusive or coercive, it remains to be
determined whether the action was within or without the "range
of reasonableness." 99 The conclusion stands, therefore, absent
fraud or other misconduct, reasonable, non-preclusive and noncoercive action taken in response to a reasonably perceived
threat will yield business judgment rule protection. 100
The only remaining extension of Unocal due noting was
decided four years after Unocal in Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc.101 Moran involved the Household International, Inc
("Household") board enacting preemptively
a defensive
mechanism to prevent future takeovers.1 02 In brief explanation,
the plan consisted of two triggering events, each having the effect
of empowering the board to counter and forestall takeover
attempts until the board could thoroughly review the given
98 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88 (expounding upon Unocal proportionality test);
see also Gilbert L. Henry, Note, Continuing Director Provisions: These Next Generation
ShareholderRights Plans are Fair and Reasoned Responses to Hostile Takeover Measures,
79 B.U. L. REV. 989, 1010 n.157 (1999) (acknowledging the Unitrin court's exposition of
Unocal test to entail twofold inquiry).
99 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388. The court noted that, when confronted with a defensive
measure neither preclusive nor coercive, a court applying Unocal must then concern itself
with whether the action is within the "range of reasonableness." Id. The Delaware
Supreme Court directed that courts take into account three factors when reviewing "range
of reasonableness." Id. at 1389. The first factor is to determine whether the action is "a
statutorily authorized form of business decision which a board of directors may routinely
make in a non-takeover context." Id. Second, the court should consider whether, as a
defensive response, the action was "limited and corresponded in degree or magnitude to
the degree or magnitude of the threat, (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively 'mild,' was
the response relatively 'mild?')." Id. Finally, the court must consider whether the
defensively acting board "properly recognized that all shareholders are not alike, and
provided immediate liquidity to those shareholders who wanted it." Id. There are several
factors pertinent to a "range of reasonableness" determination. See Gregory W.
Werkheiser, Comment, Defending the Corporate Bastion: Proportionality and the
Treatment of Draconian Defenses from Unocal to Unitrin, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 103, 120
(1996).
100 See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388 (concluding that defensive response which is not
draconian and is within range of reasonableness shall be accorded judicial deference); see
also Kimberly J. Burgess, Note, Gaining Perspective: Directors' Duties in the Context of
"No-Shop" and "No-Talk" Provisions in Merger Agreements, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
431, 458 (2001) (noting that it is only when corporate directors satisfy Unocal that
defensive measures by board will fall within ambit of the business judgment rule).
101 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
102 See id. at 1349 (noting that the measure was not adopted by the corporation in the
context of a hostile takeover). See generally Suzanne S. Dawson, Robert J. Pence, & David
S. Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 423 (1987) (defining "poison
pill[s]" as "defensive measures adopted by boards of directors in response to takeover
attempts or in advance of possible takeover attempts that can cause sever economic
repercussions in acquirer or potential controlling person").
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proposal. 0 3 This defensive action was not arbitrarily taken by
Household's board, but rather was prompted by concerns related
to recent market takeover rates and Household's inherent
attractiveness as a target candidate.104 Expanding the
application of Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held the
Household board's implementation of the defensive Rights plan
to be within the board's business judgment.105 In dictum,
however, the court succinctly noted that whether the rights plan
remains within the board's business judgment will depend on the
board's actions if and when it is faced with an actual tender
offer. 106
ii. Revlon
Inaugurated in the same year the Delaware Supreme Court
first embarked on the Unocal analysis, the Revlon duty, termed
after MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc.

(Revlon),107 governs situations calculated to fundamentally
change the structure of corporate control.108 Three parties were
engaged in the Revlon discourse: Revlon, Inc. ("Revlon"); Pantry
103 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348-49. The two triggering events were: one, an
announcement of a tender offer for 30% of Household's shares; and two, the acquisition of
20% of Household's shares by any single entity or group. Id. For a discussion of the
various provisions of "poison pill" plans and their efficacy as takeover preventatives, see
generally Dawson, supra note 102, at 426-32.
104 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349 (noting the concerns which actuated defensive
measure); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1064 (Del. Ch. 1985) (noting
corporation's susceptibility to takeover).
105 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (concluding that directors acted in good faith in
exercising an informed business judgment in adopting Rights Plan and that Plan was
reasonably related to takeover threat with which board was confronted); see also Peter V.
Letsou, Are Dead Hand (and No Hand) Poison Pills Really Dead?, 68 U. CIN. L. REV.
1101, 1116-17 (2000) (echoing Moran court's conclusion that there existed reasonable
grounds to believe that corporation was susceptible to takeover proposal and that
defensive measure was reasonably related to this threat).
106 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 ("The ultimate response to an actual takeover bid
must be judged by the Directors' actions at that time[.]"); see also David A. Rosenzweig,
Note, Poison Pill Rights: Toward a Two-Step Analysis of Directors' Fidelity to their
Fiduciary Duties, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 373 (1988) (reiterating Moran court's
admonition that, while Rights Plan was proper in pre-takeover bid context, judicial
scrutiny of director action in the face of takeover bid must be deferred until actual
takeover bid arises).
107 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985).
108 See id. at 1250 (stating that board of directors, when acting as voluntary
negotiators, must prove the rationality their decisions); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (defining two situations that implicate
Revlon's enhanced judicial scrutiny); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications
Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1266 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993) (holding Revlon's
enhanced judicial scrutiny to apply when there is a change of corporate control).
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Pride; and Forstmann Little & Co ("Forstmann Little").109
Following discussions between Pantry Pride and Revlon
executives for a possible acquisition of Revlon by Pantry Pride,
Revlon instituted two anti-takeover defense mechanisms, neither
of which entirely foreclosed potential offerors.110 Subsequently,
over the course of roughly two months, Pantry Pride and
Forstmann Little partook in a bidding war for Revlon."'1 Despite
communication by Pantry Pride to Revlon that Pantry Pride
intended to counter every offer made by Forstmann Little,
2
Revlon tilted the bidding process in favor of Forstmann Little,11
3
eventually granting Forstmann Little both a "lock-up"11 and "noshop" 114 provision. Together, these provisions effectively ended
all bidding and spawned Revlon.115 The Delaware Supreme
Court, addressing this situation, held that, given the Revlon
board of directors' prior concession to a break up of Revlon, 1 16 the
fiduciary duty Revlon's board of directors owed to Revlon's
109 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1242 (stating parties involved in case); see also Daniel S.
Cahill & Stephen P. Wink, Time and Time Again the Board is Paramount:The Evolution
of the Unocal Standard and the Revlon Trigger Through Paramount v. Time, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 159, 170 (1990) (listing parties involved in lawsuit).
110 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1244, 1247 (referring to two anti-takeover defense
mechanisms authorized by board of directors and noting adoption of defensive devices,
such as those adopted by Revlon, are, in general terms, within board's business judgment
as "calculated to strengthen the board's bargaining position"); see also Cahill & Wink,
supra note 109, at 170 (commenting on Revlon's defensive tactics to thwart Pantry Pride's
takeover).
111 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1244-46 (explaining bidding war between Pantry Pride,
Forstmann Little and Adler & Shaykin); see also Cahill & Wink, supra note 109, at 170-71
(describing the tactical maneuvers taken by each corporation during the bidding war).
112 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1248 (referring to exclusionary methods against Pantry
Pride by Revlon); see also Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1079 (1983) (deciphering between legal and illegal lock-up options by
applying primary purpose test so that if corporation's primary purpose is to exclude
parties from participating in bidding process, then it qualifies as illegal lock-up option).
113 See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1249
(Del. Ch. 1985) (defining lock-up provision); see also Cahill & Wink, supra note 109, at 171
(referring to Forstmann's demand for lock-up provision for two of Revlon's divisions).
114 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1249 (defining no-shop provision); see also Cahill & Wink,
supra note 109, at 171 (referring to Forstmann's demand for no-shop provision in the
agreement).
115 See Unocal Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (explaining
parameters of defense mechanisms under business judgment rule); see also Revlon, 501
A.2d at 1250 (noting that Revlon's board of directors breached its duty of loyalty by
excluding Pantry Pride from bidding process).
116 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1248 (referring to defense mechanisms used by Revlon's
board of directors); see also Robert E. Bull, Note, Directors' Responsibilities and
Shareholders'Interests in the Aftermath of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 885, 888-89 (1989) (commenting that board of directors' prior acts were
signals of board's willingness to sell corporation).
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shareholders shifted from protecting the 'corporate bastion"'17
solely to maximizing shareholder wealth.11 8 The Court then
deemed the Revlon board's issuance of the "lock-up" and "noshop" provisions to Forstmann Little to be in breach of this
fiduciary duty.11 9 Specifically, in reaching this holding, the court
acknowledged abandonment by the board of future prospects as a
going concern in the present form, consequently requiring the
board to auction the corporation to the highest bidder. 120
Following its decision in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court
noted in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.121
Revlon's application to two distinct situations: one, where a
corporation "initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear
break-up of the company;"1 22 and two, where a corporation, "in
response to a bidder's offer.., abandons its long-term strategy
and seeks an alternative transaction also involving the break-up
of the company."12 3 Limiting Revlon's application to the above
two instances, Time's holding solidified the interrelationship
between Unocal and Revlon by deeming defensive action taken
by a target board to ward off long-term-goal-threatening hostile
bidders during a merger not to be within Revlon.12 4 Notably, the
structure of the discourse in Time is distinguishable from that of
Revlon and, thus, requiring of different treatment. Unlike
117 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995) ("When a
corporation is not for sale, the board of directors is the defender of the metaphorical
medieval corporate bastion and the protector of the corporation's shareholders."); see also
Cahill & Wink, supra note 109, at 172-73 (commenting during that time, defense
mechanisms were useless and that board's only responsibility was to protect shareholders'
value).
118 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250-51 ("[Ihe recognition of [a] breakup.., required
the board to view its primary role as the promoter of bids, with price the dominant
consideration.").
119 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250 (citing how board did not conform to duty of loyalty
component to of business judgment rule).
120 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1251 (explaining how court failed its primary role as
promoter of bids by permitting other considerations to dictate its approach to
shareholders); see also Wells M. Engledow, Structuring CorporateBoard Action To Meet
The Ever-DecreasingScope of Revlon Duties, 63 ALB. L. REV. 505, 513 (1999) (discussing
holding of Revlon).
121 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
122 Id. at 1150.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 1150-51 (explaining that if "the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer
is found to constitute only a defensive response. . . Revlon duties are not triggered,
though Unocal duties attach"); see also Engledow, supra note 120, at 514 (comparing
similarities and differences between Revlon and Unocal).
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Revlon, the hostile bidder's target in Time was, and intended to
remain, the acquirer and not the acquiree.12 5 As such, the Court
in Time deemed defensive actions taken with regard to protecting
the corporation's continued existence to be outside the clutches of
Revlon analysis.12 6
Thought to be definitively limited in Time to two situations,
Revlon proved in QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount
Communications Inc.1 27 to be a more controlling adversary.128
The QVC dilemma began with an initial highly locked up
agreement
129
between
Paramount
Communications
("Paramount"), the defendant, and Viacom to merge the two
entities. The merger would transfer a controlling, seventy
percent block of shares to Viacom's pre-merger majority
shareholder. 1 30 In an attempt to prevent hostile intervention,
Viacom and Paramount executives released press statements
that neither company was up for general sale, phoned possible
interested parties to dissuade them from acting,131 and
deliberately avoided inquiry into candidates Paramount knew
were of interest. 13 2 All of this action was, however, to no avail
and a hostile bidder, QVC, entered negotiations.1 3 3 Over the
125 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1143-49. Time's board had first considered expanding
operations in the spring of 1987. Id. at 1144. As Paramount made successive bids, Time
reiterated its position that only a deal with Warner was in its future. Id. at 1149.
126 See id. at 1150-51 (holding Unocal duties attach to Time's actions).
127 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993).
128 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1265 (citing how under Delaware law, there are two
circumstances which may implicate Revlon duties); see also Engledow, supra note 120, at
516 (clarifying how Revlon duties should be interpreted).
129 See QVC, 635 A.2d at 1251 (discussing asset and stock option lockup terms); see
also S. Todd Barfield, Note, Directors Or Auctioneers? Turning Back Time in Paramount
v. QVC, 62 UMKC L. REV. 893, 908 (1994) (stating that heightened duties of Revlon must
apply because of lockup provisions).
130 See QVC, 635 A.2d at 1249 (noting by selective deployment of poison pill,
Paramount is forcing shareholders to favor Viacom's lower price).
131 See id. at 1252 (explaining that Mr. Redstone called executives from TCI and QVC
to discourage them from bidding).
132 See id. at 1253 (noting board quickly rejected unwelcome offer with little data).
133 See QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 125258 (Del. Ch. 1993). QVC began contact with Paramount by offering to acquire Paramount
at $80 per share. Id. at 1252. Despite Paramount's prompt public announcement that a
deal with Viacom was in its best interests, Paramount agreed to go over the QVC
proposal. Id. at 1253. QVC also attempted to meet in person and discuss the deal, but
Paramount delayed meeting. Id. at 1253-54. Frustrated, QVC decided, after seeing
private negotiations were of no avail, that its only option would be to initiate a public,
hostile tender offer. Id. at 1254. It did so at $80 cash for the first 51% of Paramount's
common stock, followed by a second step stock-for-stock exchange on non-coercive terms.
Id. In response to this, Viacom upped its bid. Id. Financial advisors for Paramount
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ensuing three months Paramount's board provided preferential
treatment to Viacom.1 34 The Delaware Court of Chancery
addressed this situation, beginning its analysis by rejecting the
limited approach of Time.135 The court then proceeded to hold
that a mere change of corporate control requires directors to
maximize short-term shareholder wealth.136 Fundamental to this
holding is the reality that long term goals become irrelevant to
pre-merger minority shareholders who remain shareholders in a
control-changing
merger, in that, absent supermajority
provisions or other like protections,13 7 nothing prevents the new
controlling shareholder from squeezing-out in a second step the
remaining minority shareholders and thus depriving them of any
long term benefits.' 3 8 The bottom line, therefore, now stands that
business combinations having the effect of fundamentally
altering the control structure of a corporation invoke Revlon.139

concluded new Viacom's offer to be worth roughly $1.65 more per share than QVC's offer
as well as likely to yield $3 billion more in incremental shareholder value. Id. at 1256.
Based upon these financial reports, Paramount executed an agreement with Viacom. Id.
Following this agreement signing, both QVC and Viacom upped their bids again.
Paramount, however, stuck its ground, refusing to agree to any procedures amounting to
an auction. Id. at 1257. In the end, Paramount concluded, based on a new set of financial
reports by its financial advisor, not to further pursue negotiations with QVC. Id. To note,
however, these financial statements only stated a merger with Viacom was "fair" and
expressly warned no opinions were being given with regard to QVC's offer. Id. at 1255.
This lack of opinion followed from Paramount's prohibition on its financial advisor from
speaking with QVC. Id.
134 See id. at 1252-53 (explaining that Viacom and Paramount publicly and privately
clarified that other bids were unwelcome and Mr. Redstone called executives from TCI
and QVC to discourage them from bidding).
135 See id. at 1265 (noting that circumstances here are different and raise fiduciary
and fairness concerns).
136 See id. at 1266 ("In colloquial terms, that duty is to do for the shareholders what
the shareholders would otherwise do for themselves-to seek the best premium-conferring
transaction that is available in the circumstances.").
137 See id. at 1267 n.42 (describing possible post-merger minority protections). See
generally Barfield, supra note 129, at 910-11 (noting the board was required to take a
closer look at increased bid).
138 See QVC, 635 A.2d at 1267 (noting that shareholders will have no long -run
benefits); see also Joseph W. Bartlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in
Burnout/Cramdown Financings, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 593, 603 (1995) (noting the
compelling element effect 'squeeze out mergers' have on minority shareholders); Carol
Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing ShareholderParticipationin Corporate
Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 425 n. 291 (1994)
(explaining process of "squeeze out merger").
139 See QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 126667 (Del. Ch. 1993) (noting there are few events that are as significant as change in
control); see also Barfield, supra note 129, at 908 (noting this case is clearly change of
control case).
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III. PRECLUSIVE AND COERCIVE BOARD ACTION

Corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation's shareholders and may take
defensive action to protect the corporate enterprise, and thus the
shareholders, from reasonably perceived dangers. 14 0 Threats of
opportunity loss, structural coercion and substantive coercion are
legitimate concerns a board may support its defensive action
upon. 14 1 It is imperative that this leeway be extended to boards if
they are to be expected to succeed in their fundamental duties;14 2
however, the law prevents the totality of board action from being
preclusive or coercive of the shareholders' will.143 As previously
stated, the Court in Omnicare held a mixture of shareholder and

board action to constitute "board action" within the context of
Unocal-Revlon precedent and, accordingly, concluded that the
140 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting
that fiduciary duty to act in best interests of corporation's shareholders extends "to
protecting the corporation and its owners from perceived harm, whether a threat
originates from third parties or other shareholders"); see also Grand Metropolitan Public,
Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing how fiduciary duties
of care and loyalty owed to corporation and its shareholders apply "with equal force" to
corporate mergers and corporate takeovers).
141 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n. 17
(Del. 1989) (highlighting three different types of hostile threats that exist and how some
commentators believe that acceptance of "substantive coercion" helps to guarantee
legitimacy of Unocal standard). See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 269 (1989) (noting courts should classify
various types of "threats" into three categories of opportunity loss, structural coercion,
and substantive coercion in order to apply appropriate test effectively).
142 See Richard M. Buxbaum, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence:
U.S. National Reports to the XVITH InternationalCongress of Comparative Law: Section
III Facilitative and Mandatory Rules in the CorporationLaw(s) of the United States, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 258 (2002) (noting Delaware courts have denied shareholders' right
to amend corporate bylaws to enable shareholders to participate in regulating corporate
business and affairs); Kurt F. Gwynne, Employment of Turnaround Management
Companies, "Disinterestedness"Issues Under the Bankruptcy Code, and Issues Under
Delaware General Corporation Law, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 673, 703-04 (2002)
(describing board's duty to run the corporation's business and affairs and noting duty is
non-delegable).
143 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Mergers and Acquisitions: "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills,
Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted ByLaws: An Essay For Warren Buffett, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 525 (1997) (describing Unocal/Unitrin analysis as "significantly
[circumscribing] a reviewing court's scrutiny of defensive tactics"); Henry, supra note 98,
at 1016-18 (explaining thoroughly second prong of UnocalfUnitrin analysis and applying
analysis to poison pills); Thomas A. Swett, Comment, Merger Terminations after Bell
Atlantic: Applying a Liquidated Damages Analysis to Termination Fee Provisions, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 341, 367-68 (1998) (positing Unocal/Unitrinframework recognizes greater
respect for shareholder franchise as well as the board of directors' need for latitude when
exercising their duties).

ST JOHN'SJOURAAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 2 1:1

amalgamation was preclusive and coercive. 14 4 It has been
previously submitted that the Delaware Supreme Court erred in
its application of Unocal and Revlon, as well as both their
progeny.
A. Unocal Offending Board Action
i. Overview
At this point, before delving into a juxtaposition of Omnicare
with prior interpretations of preclusive and coercive enounced by
the Delaware courts, I would like to make two observations, each
of extreme significance. First, the initial post-Unocal statements
of the Delaware Supreme Court regarding openness to board
action in times of corporate distress were enounced in Revlon.145
The Court opined in Revlon that judicial review will be different
where only one genuine bidder exists in the market and fear of
losing that genuine bidder prompts decisive board action. 146 This
declaration by the Court was ostensibly intended to grant greater
deference to a board to lock-up a deal where, as in Omnicare, it is
faced with no viable alternative.14 7 Furthermore, this
declaration, by recognizing the need of a board to grant more
favorable terms in certain circumstances, purports to narrow the
definitions of preclusive and coercive action in such situations
lacking an array of bidders.
Finally, of major significance is the Court's prior interpretation
of Unocal in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc.,14 8 the

144 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932 (Del. 2003) (noting
that when examining reasonableness of board action, "defensive devices" employed must
be "proportionate to the perceived threat" to both corporation and shareholders, if merger
transaction does not occur).
145 MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.
1985).
146 See id. at 1250 (discussing business judgment rule and how it doesn't apply to
lock-up options which ultimately relieve directors of liability for their own defensive
policies).
147 See Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp 772, 784 (D.
Del. 1988) (highlighting another factor determining validity of lock-up options is the
timing of auction process); see also Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250 (discussing significance of
lock-up provisions and how they must not be used to "retard" bidding process, enforcing
idea that shareholders are best served in competitive marketplace).
148 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
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approach oddly declared as didactic by the Court in Omnicare.149
In Mills, the court focused on board actions that enhanced the
shareholder's interest and were "reasonable in relation to the
advantage sought to be achieved."1 5 0 Be it that this is simply a
rewording of Unocal in positive terms, it illustrates that the
Court's focus, at least before the year 2000, was in protecting
board action motivated by intentions to boost shareholder
wealth.151 Taking into account the Court's statements in Revlon,
which arguably narrowed preclusive and coercive board action in
situations with dismal bidder alternatives, the Court's
statements in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc. seemingly
indicate boards are to have a more expansive power to act, before
their action is declared preclusive or coercive, to protect
shareholders by locking in for them the best of available
alternatives, given otherwise imminent harm to occur absent the
protective action.
ii. Preclusive and Coercive
An analysis juxtaposing Omnicare with historical Delaware
case law begins with AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton
& Co.,152 the case in which the Delaware Court of Chancery held
preclusive and contrary to Unocal's mandate a board's defensive
action taken toward a hostile tender offer.15 3 Faced with an
arguably fair and non-coercive tender offer by AC Acquisitions,
the Anderson, Clayton & Co. board initiated as a defense a selftender offer for eight million shares at sixty dollars per share. 154
If successfully consummated, this self-tender offer would have
had the effect of depressing all non-tendering shares to roughly
one third of their pre-consummation values.155 Prior to AC
149 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 933 (Del. 2003) (holding
the Macmillan analysis inapplicable in situations involving defensive devices being
"challenged vis-A-vis their effect on a subsequent competing alternative merger").
150 Mills, 559 A.2d at 1288.
151 See id. (noting that if board believed that shareholder interests were enhanced,
and if board's actions were reasonable, then those actions are entitled to protection of
business judgment rule); see also Karl F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513,
533 (2003) (explaining benefits and problems arising from deal protection devices enacted
while boards are under a duty to maximize shareholder wealth).
152 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
153 See id. at 114 (holding that breach of duty of loyalty was likely).
154 See id. at 109-110 (describing terms of tender offer).
155 See id. at 106-110 (noting lack of choices that shareholders had).
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Acquisitions Corp., acceptable board of director action taken in
defense of a corporation was limited by Unocal to that which was
not 'draconian' in nature; however, although the Court in Unocal
noted the duty of loyalty owed to shareholders, it did not
explicate
what
constituted
draconian
action
toward
shareholders. 15 6 In AC Acquisitions Corp, the Court added clarity
to Unocal by focusing on the coercive affect that the Anderson,
57
Clayton & Co. board's action had on the shareholder franchise.1
The court noted that timing of the self-tender offer such that the
shareholders would have a backup in the event the A.C.
Acquisitions Corp. offer failed, rather than initiating the self
tender offer as a prefatory defensive action, would have been
non-coercive and a different story. 15 8 This decision marks the
beginning by the Delaware courts of a focus on actions that
disrupt the shareholder franchise when determining whether to
invoke Unocal.159

Albeit the Delaware Supreme Court is not bound by
pronouncements of the lower Delaware courts, the Court's
holding in Omnicare was in stark contrast to that previously

declared by the Court of Chancery in A.C. Acquisitions Corp.160

Specifically, in Omnicare, the Court held the target board's
actions coercive and preclusive, despite the fact that these
actions lacked persuasive effect on the shareholder franchise.
156 See Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F.Supp. 1545, 1555 (D. Del.
1995) (juxtaposing draconian means with defensive measures that are reasonable in
relation to threat posed); see also Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (stating "A corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived
threat by any Draconian means available").
157 See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 113-14 (Del.
Ch. 1986) (noting that board decisions left shareholders with no recourse).
158 See id. at 114 (discussing how alternative tenders would have benefited
shareholders' interests).
159 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del.
1990) (discussing court's emphasis that Unocal applies to those situations where
shareholders are coerced to act contrary to their wishes thus disrupting stability of
corporation); see also AC Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d at 113 (depicting court's application
of Unocal when it reasoned that defendants' option is unreasonable in relation to threat
posed because it is coercive and precludes shareholders from having ability to accept
reasonable, alternative option).
160 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003) (ruling that
NCS' board could not ignore its fiduciary duties to minority stockholders by leaving it
solely to stockholders to decide when two stockholders had already combined to make
outcome a "foregone conclusion"); see also A.C. Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d at 113
(applying Unocal's test and ruling that it was unreasonable in relation to threat for board
"to structure such an option so as to preclude as a practical matter shareholders from
accepting" the opposing offer).
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This holding seemingly abolished the prior approach, as seen in
A.C. Acquisitions Corp. and many Delaware Supreme Court
cases to follow, which focused primarily on protection of
shareholder will.161
Chronologically following A. C. Acquisitions Corp. is Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ("Time").1 62 In Time, two
companies, Time and Warner, conceived a business combination
consisting of a stock for stock exchange.1 6 3 At Warner's request,
Time included two protective mechanisms in the merger,
64
specifically a no shop clause and a share exchange agreement.1
Paramount, interested in Time and aware of the activity between
Time and Warner, subsequently initiated a hostile tender offer
for Time.165 In response to Paramount's offer, Time restructured
its merger with Warner into an all cash acquisition so as to
remove the need for majority stockholder approval and, thus,
guarantee consummation of the Time-Warner deal.16 6 Suit was
161 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 944-45 (Veasey, J., dissenting). Justice Veasey
clarified in his dissent that Outcalt and Shaw, the two majority shareholders, were fully
informed and made an "informed choice to commit their voting power to the merger." Id.
at 944. Justice Veasey also emphasized Outcalt and Shaw held a combined 65% of NCS's
outstanding voting shares and, therefore, it was irrelevant whether the minority felt any
"coercion" because, even if the voting agreements were not granted, the minority 35%
would have had no controlling say. Id. It is also important to note here that both Outcalt
and Shaw were experienced businessmen holding high level executive positions within
NCS (Outcalt being the Chairman of NCS's board of directors; Shaw being the President,
CEO and director of NCS) and, therefore, are educated in the current matter and less
likely of being subject to coercion of franchise. Id. at 918-19.
162 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
163 See id. at 1146 (noting date of Time's unanimous approval of "the stock-for-stock
merger with Warner"); see also Phillip J. Azzollini, Note, The Wake of Paramount v. QVC:
Can a Majority Shareholder Avoid Triggering the Auction Duty During a Merger and
Retain a Significant Equity Interest? Suggestion: A Pooling of Interests, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 573, 583-84 (1994) (describing merger between Time and Warner).
164 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1146-47 (detailing no-shop clause and share exchange
agreement adopted by Time at Warner's insistence to prevent Warner being "left 'on the
auction block"'); see also Lisa A. Duda, Comment, Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time, Inc.: A Decision of ParamountSignificance?, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 153-54 (1991)
(listing various protectionary measures included in Time and Warner's agreement).
165 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1147 (characterizing Paramount's all-cash tender offer to
purchase Time as "surprising" to Time and Warner, and noting that Paramount's tender
offer was not hastily planned and had been discussed for months); see also Steven J. Fink,
The Rebirth of the Tender Offer? Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,
20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 133, 153-54 (1995) (recounting circumstances surrounding
Paramount's hostile tender offer).
166 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (noting Time's decision to "recast its consolidation
with Warner into an outright cash and securities acquisition of Warner by Time"); see also
Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover
Jurisprudence, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 583, 595 (1994) (noting that "[in response to
Paramount's hostile tender offer for Time, the original merger agreement was revised to a
cash tender offer by Time for Warner shares"); Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison,
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eventually commenced between the parties and the Court
acquired another opportunity to further Unocal's directive.16 7 In
Time, the Court held Time's acquisition of Warner not to invoke
Revlon and, in addition, not to violate the principles of Unocal.168
The Delaware Supreme Court's holding emphasized that Time's
actions were not "aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders a
management-sponsored alternative,"169 but rather were centered
on carrying out a preexisting board strategy. 170 The Time holding
also noted that none of Time's defensive actions precluded
Paramount from acquiring in the future the combined TimeWarner.171
The Court's decision in Omnicare again stands at diametric
odds with a prior Delaware pronouncement focused on protecting
shareholder rights; this time, however, the prior pronouncement
being one of the Delaware Supreme Court. 172 In Omnicare, the

Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger
of Equals Transactions,2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2001) (referring to 'Time and
Warner boards' defensive restructuring of their merger, a defensive action that prevented
the stockholders of Time from voting on the merger").
167 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1141-43 (discussing facts leading to suit and affirming
"Chancellor's ultimate finding and conclusion under Unocal"); see also Kerr, supra note
62, at 641 (noting that Paramount sought to "enjoin Time's acquisition of Warner" in
Delaware's court of chancery).
168 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del.
1990) (stating, " [i]f, however, [as here,] the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is
found to constitute only a defensive response and not an abandonment of the corporation's
continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered, though Unocal duties attach"); see
also Portia Policastro, Note, When Delaware Corporate Managers Turn Auctioneers:
Triggering the Revlon Duty After the Paramount Decision, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 187,
225 (1991) (noting that "[t]he Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's
ultimate finding that the Revlon duty had not been implicated").
169 Time, 571 A.2d at 1154-55. The court restated and affirmed the Chancellor's
finding that Time's response was "reasonably related to the threat". Id. The court also
discussed the facts of the closely analogous case that the Chancellor relied upon in
deciding this issue, citing Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del.
Ch. 1989). Id. at 1155 n.19.
170 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1154 (noting Time's lengthy "investigation of potential
merger candidates, including Paramount," prior to Paramount's tender offer); see also
Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 166, at 57-58 (arguing that driving force in Time
decision was "extensive market check Time performed before it selected Warner as its
merger partner").
171 See Time, 571 A.2d at 1155 (explaining that Time's actions were ultimately
unsuccessful).
172 See generally Arons, supra note 11, at 122 (outlining changes in Delaware law as
result to Omnicare, and noting Delaware Supreme Court's adoption of two-tiered
proportionality reasonableness test for corporate defensive devices); Brian C. Smith,
Comment, Changing the Deal: How Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare Threatens to
Fundamentally Alter the Merger Industry, 73 MiSS. L.J. 983, 999 (2004) (arguing that
"[t]he court's rigid application of Unocal is an unwarranted step away from the

2006]

THE DEMISEOF CLARITY

Court held as preclusive and coercive board action which
unconditionally vested in the majority shareholders the decision
of whether to grant voting agreements to Genesis.173 Accordingly,
the Court in Omnicare, by deeming the NCS board's action
preclusive and coercive, misinterprets Unocal's focus as enounced
in Time. 17 4 It is worth noting that the Court in Omnicare
additionally ignored another crucial part of its prior analysis in
Time by failing to recognize that future acquisition by Omnicare
of the combined NCS/Genesis entity was not impossible. None of
the defensive actions taken by NCS, an otherwise floundering
company, prevented Omnicare from acquiring the combined
NCS-Genesis entity.175 At the very least, the NCS-Genesis
merger increased NCS's otherwise illaudable bargaining position
in future negotiations for merger with or acquisition by Omnicare
or other like entities and, thus, created greater potential future
76
value in the shareholders.1
traditionally fact-specific decision-making process that is the hallmark of Delaware
corporate law").
173 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 921-26 (Del. 2003)
(explaining that Outcalt and Shaw granted the voting agreements with due care and that
NCS was unable to find any structurally or financially attractive transaction prior to
Outcalt and Shaw granting voting agreements other than with Genesis).
174 Compare Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55
(Del. 1989) (holding Time's defensive mechanisms did not 'cram down' on its shareholders
a management-sponsored alternative or preclude Paramount from making offer for
combined Time-Warner entity), with Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 926 (holding NCS's defensive
mechanisms - forcing shareholder vote and allowing majority shareholders to grant
voting agreements - to be preclusive and coercive).
175 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925-26. The only two defensive mechanisms instituted
by NCS were, one, a provision requiring the decision on whether to merge with Genesis to
be sent to the shareholders regardless of the directors' opinion and, two, voting
agreements representing a majority of the outstanding NCS voting shares cast in favor of
a merger with Genesis. Id. Neither of these defensive devices had any effect on the mergeability of the combined NCS/Genesis entity. For an example of a defensive mechanisms
having this preventative effect, see Bonnie Green Camden, Note, The Reasonableness of
Defensive Takeover Maneuvers when the Corporate Raider is Mr. T. Boone Pickens:
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corporation, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 739, 750-52 (1988), which discusses various anti-takeover measures taken by
target companies.
176 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 919 (explaining that NCS was the leading provider of
healthcare and support services for the elderly and, therefore, likely to add much value to
a transaction with NCS); see also Heath D Rodman, Comment, Death Toll for the Dead
Hand?: The Survivability of the Dead Hand Provision in CorporateAmerica, 48 EMORY L.
J. 991, 1004-05 (1999) (discussing dead hand provision and its effects); Roberta Romano,
Article, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119,
161-62 (1992) (explaining ways a target may increase its bargaining position and
reasoning behind it); Annette Simon, Note, MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.: An
Attempt to Clarify the Blasius/UnocalFramework, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 n.19 (2004)
(indicating that new defensive techniques have emerged that have "increased the leverage
of the board of directors in finding a better deal").
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Unocal was clarified further by the Delaware Supreme Court
in In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litigation (Santa
Fe).1 77 In Santa Fe,17 8 the Delaware Supreme Court, responding
to a motion for summary judgment, again spoke on the effects of
defensive board action on the shareholder franchise. 179 The Court
made two important findings: first, board action that "coerces
stockholders to accede to a transaction to which they would
otherwise not agree is problematic;"180 and second, enhanced
judicial review is "designed to assure that stockholders vote or
decide to tender in an atmosphere free from undue coercion."1S1
As in the cases noted above, the Delaware Supreme Court's focus
was not solely on what outcome the board was trying to reach,
but rather predominantly driven by whether the board's actions
materially interfered with the shareholder's ability to
independently, meaning without unwarranted influence, choose
82
the corporation's future.
Again the Omnicare decision is in contradiction with that
previously held by the Delaware Supreme Court, such that it
177 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
178 See id. at 63-65. Four companies were involved in the Santa Fe litigation: Santa
Fe, Burlington, Allegheny Corporation, and Union Pacific. Id. To begin the discourse,
Burlington and Santa Fe entered into an initial merger agreement whereby Santa Fe's
stockholders would receive roughly $13.50 per share as consideration. Id. at 63. Union
Pacific contacted Santa Fe soon after this initial agreement was reached and proposed a
merger with Santa Fe yielding roughly $18.00 per share for Santa Fe's stockholders. Id.
Santa Fe proceeded to reject the Union Pacific offer, claiming it would not receive the
requisite Interstate Commerce Commission approval. Id. In addition to this rejection,
Santa Fe recommended to its stockho'ders that they not tender their shares to Union
Pacific's subsequent tender offer. Id. at 64. In a meeting between Santa Fe and
Burlington, occurring after Union Pacific's tender offer, Santa Fe requested and received
a higher price for its shareholders, now roughly $20 per share. Id. As a final seal on its
actions, Santa Fe devised three separate transactions (stock purchase by Allegheny
Corporation whereby Santa Fe waived its rights provision to allow it; joint tender offer
between Santa Fe and Burlington; and a Repurchase Program by Santa Fe of 10 million
of is shares), having the combined effect of placing 33% of the Santa Fe shareholder vote
under the control of Santa Fe. Id. at 64-65.
179 See id. at 68 (noting issues up for judgment); see also Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick
J. Tangney, Protection of Minority ShareholderRights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing
Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing Long-Term Share Value by
Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725, 755-58 (1995)
(explaining Delaware corporate law with regard to protecting shareholder franchise);
William J. Carney, Panel I: The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate Control"and Origins
of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215, 221-25 (1999) (discussing
historical perspective on balance of power between shareholders and management).
180 Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 68.
181 Id. at 68.
182 See id. (analyzing whether shareholders were given chance to vote on offering
without undue influence); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting coercive nature of tender offer for shareholders).
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failed to take into account or, at the minimum, properly weigh
the shareholder franchise. 8 3 The Court's decision in Omnicare,
specifically that portion deeming NCS's actions preclusive and
coercive, neither mentions nor alludes to disruption of the
shareholder franchise. Furthermore, it does not analyze or even
address the competence of the two majority shareholders who
granted the voting agreements in question. 8 4
The analysis now reaches the case declared by the Court in
Omnicare to contain the "test for stockholder coercion:"185 Brazen
v. Bell Atlantic Corporation.i8 6 In Brazen, the Court held that
coercion occurs "where the board or some other party takes
actions which have the effect of causing the stockholders to vote
in favor of the proposed transaction for some reason other than
the merits of that transaction,"18 7 noting the analysis must be
done on a case-by-case basis.18 8 The Court then applied the test
to hold as non-coercive a $550 million termination fee, on the
ground that no proof was adduced to conclude shareholders were
swayed by its existence.1 8 9
Interestingly, although Omnicare was decided just five years
after Brazen and Brazen was directly referred to as authoritative
in Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court seems to wholly
ignore its stricture. 19 0 At the time the NCS majority shareholders
granted voting agreements, they were at the very minimum
wholly informed of NCS's financial status; otherwise dismal
economic future prospects; fruitless attempts to find other
183 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935-36 (Del. 2003)
(failing to address or even mention general disruption of shareholder franchise). See
generally In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 67-68 (Del. 1995)
(concluding that special import exists in certain circumstances to protect shareholders'
franchise).
184 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936, 944-45 (stating that "[t]he deal protection devices
adopted by the NCS board were designed to coerce the consummation of the Genesis
merger and preclude the consideration of any superior transaction" and explaining
competence of Outcalt and Shaw).
185 Id. at 935.
186 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
187 Id. at 50.
188 Id. (describing proper way to analyze cases in which directors induce shareholders
to tender shares for improper motives).
189 See id. (finding $550 million termination fee to be "reasonable forecast of
damages").
190 See generally Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del.
2003) (failing to give weight to the reasonableness of decision to enter agreement); cf.
Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49 (applying reasonableness test).
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suitors; and highly conditional, speculative alternatives.19 1
Therefore, it is exceedingly speculative to hold, as did the
Delaware Supreme Court, that the majority shareholders in
Omnicare voted in favor of the transaction with Genesis for any
reason other than the merits of the transaction.
Following Brazen, the Delaware Chancery Court in Carmody v.
Toll Brothers, Inc. 192 held a "dead-hand" provision enacted
within a Rights plan, which had the effect of disenfranchising the
company's stockholders, to be sufficient to state a claim on the
pleadings for coercion and preclusion.19 3 Perceiving itself as a
potential takeover candidate given recent market activity, Toll
Brothers adopted a standard Rights Plan containing both a flipover and flip-in provision.19 4 Unique to this Rights Plan was a
"dead-hand" provision that placed into current and continuing
directors, or those other persons expressly designated by such
current and continuing directors, the sole discretion to redeem
the Rights.195 The effect of this provision was to prevent any and
all directors not specifically endorsed by Toll Brother's current or
continuing directors from eliminating the Rights and, thus, from
taking over Toll Brothers in anything but a financially disastrous
way.19 6 The court deemed important for analysis of coerciveness
within the Unocal framework the disenfranchisement of voters
caused by the Rights Plan's disempowering effect on insurgentdirectors; specifically, the deprivation of full directorial power.197
The court in Carmody also reasoned, consonant with that
191 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921-27 (discussing NCS's financial deteriation).
192 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
193 See id. at 1195 (holding that provision disenfranchises shareholders by forcing
them to vote for incumbent directors if shareholders want to be represented by board
entitled to exercise its full statutory prerogatives).
194 See id. at 1183 (explaining "flip-in" feature of rights plan triggered when acquirer
crosses specified ownership threshold regardless of intentions, and "flip-over" feature
entitling target company shareholders to purchase shares of acquiring company at
reduced price which is activated after "flip-in" triggering event, such as merger or sale of
assets).
195 See id. at 1184 (explaining "dead hand" provision as preventing any directors of
Toll Brothers, except those in office as of date of Rights Plan's adoption from redeeming
Rights until they expire ten years after such date).
196 See id. (noting poison pill in effect makes take-over "prohibitively expensive"); see
also Mark J. Loewenstein, Delawareas Demon: Twenty-Five Years after Professor Cary's
Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 515 (2000) (explaining effects of "dead hand" poison
pills on potential bidders).
197 See Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1195 (holding that disenfranchisement of shareholders
caused by their being forced to vote for incumbent directors if shareholders want to be
represented by board is sufficiently coercive).
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previously held in Time, 198 that the Rights Plan worked to
preclude shareholders from reaping benefits possible from future
takeovers of Toll Brothers and, therefore, was preclusive. 19 9
Decided just five years before and cited in Omnicare, Carmody
appears to exhibit a one-hundred-and-eighty degree view from
that later expressed in Omnicare.20 0 The Court in Omnicare
radically shifted the focus from preserving independence of the
shareholder franchise, as expressed in Carmody, to a prohibition
on acquiring shareholder votes on an accelerated basis regardless
of intrusion into the shareholder franchise.20 1 As the NCS board
actions did not prevent Omnicare from acquiring the combined
NCS/Genesis entity (an option Omnicare admitted in the Court of
Chancery it contemplated attempting via proxy contest)2 02 and
did not skew the shareholders options prior to voting, the NCS
board actions neither precluded shareholders from reaping future
benefits possible through merger or acquisition nor coerced them
into acting in contradiction to their intentions. 2 03
In conclusion, the tests of time seem to indicate that as long as
a board of directors' actions do not destroy the independence of
the shareholder franchise or prevent shareholders from fighting
for control of the board, and do stem from a desire to enhance the
shareholders interest, the Delaware courts will uphold such
198 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del.
1989) (noting defensive devices adopted by Time did not prevent Paramount from
acquiring combined Time/Warner entity in future).
199 See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating that
defensive measures are preclusive if they makes a bidder's ability to wage a successful
proxy contest and gain control either mathematically impossible or realistically
unattainable as was at issue here).
200 Id. at 1195 (focusing on issue of disenfranchisement of shareholders as result of
who they are forced to vote for).
201 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003). The
court focused on the fact that the defensive measures that protected the merger
transaction were unenforceable not only because they were preclusive and coercive but
specifically because the merger contract required board to act or not act in such a fashion
as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, which is invalid. Id. The court also stated that
the voting agreements and the absence of an effective fiduciary out clause made it
mathematically impossible and realistically unattainable for Omnicare transaction or any
other proposal to succeed. Id.
202 In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 263 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(noting that testimony admitted that Omnicare made bid on Genesis).
203 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 925-26 (describing NCS's defensive mechanisms); see
also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985) (determining that
"unless... the directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating themselves in
office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good
faith, or being uninformed, a Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board").
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actions. 20 4 Thus, it was a vast and unexplainable departure by
the Delaware Supreme Court to hold in Omnicare contrary to
these established norms. 2 05
iii. Unitary
Ivanhoe Partnersv. Newmont Mining Corp.,2 06 the first case to
conceptualize perceiving "inextricably related" board action as a
"unitary" response for Unocal analysis, was decided two years
after Unocal.20 7 In Ivanhoe, the Delaware Supreme Court
deemed a tripartite defense, including a dividend paid by the
target, an acquisition-standstill agreement, and a "street-sweep"
target-stock purchase, to constitute 'unitary' board action. 20 8
Unique to this defense is the fact that all three components were
designed by the target board and carried out by a specific
stockholder at the express direction of the target board. 2 09
This tripartite action, effectively wholly within the dominion of
the target board, is distinguishable from that deemed "unitary"
in Omnicare. 2 10 Unlike the tripartite defense in Ivanhoe, the
204 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 928 (noting that if board's decision is "attributed to any
rational business purpose," then courts will not substitute their judgment); see also
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949 ("We will not substitute our views for those of the board if the
latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."').
205 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936 (finding that defensive devices of NCS directors
were not reasonable because they were "preclusive and coercive" and therefore
unenforceable); see also
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) (holding
that decision by board to merge that! does not involve change in control is entitled to
judicial deference pursuant to business judgment rule).
206 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
207 See id. at 1343 ("Because Newmont's actions here are so inextricably related, the
principles of Unocal require that they be scrutinized collectively as a unitary response to
the perceived threats."); see also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (requiring courts to carefully
assess defensive measures reasonableness and results achieved).
208 See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345 ('The comprehensive defensive scheme consisting of
the dividend, standstill agreement, and street sweep accomplished the two essential
objectives of thwarting the inadequate coercive Ivanhoe offer, and of insuring the
continued interest of the public shareholders in the independent control and prosperity of
Newmont."); see also Scott P. Towers, Comment, Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp.-the Unocal Standard: More Bark Than Bite?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483, 486-87
(1990) (arguing that "the business judgment rule protected the board's tripartite defensive
measure").
209 See Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341 (suggesting that "target directors must satisfy
these prerequisites by showing good faith and reasonable investigation before enjoying
presumptions afforded by the business judgment rule"); see also Towers, supra note 208,
at 486 (discussing that "Ivanhoe involved a challenge to a three-pronged defensive
strategy implemented by a target board of directors in response to a takeover attempt").
210 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932 (Del. 2003)
(specifying that when defensive measures employed are inextricably related, they must be
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amalgam of board and stockholder action considered a "unitary"
response in Omnicare did not include shareholder action
designed and directed by the target board such that its outcome
was determined through board persuasion. 21 1 In Omnicare, the
target board decision to consummate a merger required the
majority vote of approval of all outstanding voting shares. 2 12 The
majority shareholders' prefatory granting of voting agreements to
meet this requirement, contrary to the target board devised and
implemented street-sweep stock purchase in Ivanhoe, consisted
merely of an acceleration of the inevitable stockholder vote. 2 13
Furthermore, given the dismal situation, any collateral attack of
the majority vote on grounds of coercion is fatally weakened by
the Chancery Court's finding that the shareholders who executed
the voting agreements were fully informed stockholders aware of
the company's and its constituents' future prospects absent the
successful vote. 2 14
Unitary board action was next discussed by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,215
where the Court further elaborated that all inextricably related
defensive actions taken by a board must be "scrutinized
collectively as a unitary response to [a] perceived threat."2 16 The
target board in Unitrin instituted two defensive mechanisms:
scrutinized collectively to perceived threats); see also Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1343
(instituting tripartite defense of dividends, acquisition-standstill agreement and "streetsweep").
211 Compare Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 944-45 (Veasey, J. dissenting) (highlighting
qualifications and degree of independence the NCS majority shareholders possessed when
granting voting agreements to Genesis), with Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1340 (commenting on
interrelationship between and mutual additional benefit from Newmont board and Gold
Fields with regard to "street sweep").
212 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934 (explaining that voting agreements committed
board to irrevocably vote their majority power in favor of merger); see also Knight, supra
note 24, at 30 ("The court held that when a force-the-vote provision is coupled with a
voting agreement signed by owners of a majority of voting power, there must be an
effective fiduciary out clause so that the board can discharge its fiduciary duties.").
213 Compare Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 932 ("A board's decision to protect its decision to
enter a merger agreement with defensive devices against uninvited competing
transactions that may emerge is analogous to a board's decision to protect against
dangers to corporate policy and effectiveness when it adopts defensive measures in a
hostile takeover contest."), with Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
1334, 1340 (Del. 1987) (explaining that "street-sweep" transactions would effectively
defeat Ivanhoe's bid).
214 See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 944 (Veasey, dissenting) (noting that NCS controlling
stockholders Outcalt and Shaw were fully informed stockholders who made informed
choice to commit their voting power to merger).
215 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
216 Id. at 1387.
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one, a Repurchase program designed to increase the board's
existing twenty-three percent ownership block;217 and two, a
Poison Pill.218 In its direction to the lower court on remand, the
Court deemed both actions to constitute a single unitary response
with regard to Unocal.2 19 The important detail to focus on in
Unitrin is that, as in Ivanhoe, the Court referred only to actions
specifically taken at the direction of the board to forestall hostile
intervention. The court neither showed intention nor desire to
include as within the concept, such as it proceeded to do in
Omnicare, a combination of defensive board action and un2 20
persuaded, independent shareholder approval.
B. Fiduciaryout
The initial problem with regard to an across the board
requirement for inclusion of a fiduciary out in defensive
mechanisms is the shifting fiduciary duty owed by the board of
directors. 22 1 As noted earlier, prior to the invocation of Revlon's
requirements, the fiduciary duty associated with Unocal governs
and boards of directors owe a duty to protect the corporate
217 See id. at 1370-71. The Unitrin board instituted a Repurchase Program as a
defense to American General's bid, having the effect of repurchasing 10 million of
Unitrin's outstanding shares. Id. at 1370. The important factor here is that Unitrin had in
place a provision requiring a supermajority vote mergers. Id. Unitrin's press release
stated "Unitrin's stock is undervalued in the market and that the expanded program will
tend to increase the value of the shares that remain outstanding;" however, a more
pessimistic view of this action clearly shows the board was intending to solidify its ability
to block a merger. Id. In addition, the press release stated that Unitrin's board controlled
roughly 23% of Unitrin's outstanding voting shares and the repurchase plan would
effectively increase this percentage. Id.
218 See id. at 1370 (mentioning that Poison Pill was implemented but not going into
any detail with regard to Poison Pill).
219 See id. at 1387 (highlighting that principles of Unocal require analyzing target
board's actions together as unitary response to perceived threat).
220 Compare Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935-36 (Del.
2003) (highlighting that deal protective measures adopted by board had preclusive and
coercive effect on stockholder vote), with Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387 (stating that Court of
Chancery's analysis of defensive target board actions should focus collectively on all of
board's defensive actions).
221 See Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of the Duties of Directors and
Officers in Control Contests, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91, 132 (1994) (noting shift in fiduciary duty
that occurs once Revlon is invoked); Brian K. Kidd, Note, The Need for Stricter Scrutiny:
Application of the Revlon Standard to the Use of Standstill Agreements, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2517, 2544-45 (2003) (describing shift in fiduciary duty as one of protector to
auctioneer); Policastro, supra note 168, at 195 ('The role of a corporate board of directors
shifts dramatically when the board assumes the Revlon duty... There is only one role
remaining for the board of directors, and that is to maximize the current value of the
company for the benefit of its shareholders.").
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enterprise, including the shareholders, from impending harm. 2 22
Cases have consistently held that, while the board of directors is
governed by Unocal, the board may take into account long term
goals when determining what actions are in the best interests of
the "corporate enterprise." 22 3 That being said, board decisions to
avert tender offers yielding high short-term premiums for
shareholders have been deemed wholly within the board's
business judgment and, accordingly, Unocal, even when the
alternative board action taken expects solely long term
profitability. 22 4 Vastly different to the fiduciary duty owed by a
board of directors under Unocal, however, is that owed under
Revlon. 22 5 A shift occurs after Revlon's invocation, changing the
fiduciary duty owed by the board from that of protector of the
corporate bastion to that of maximizer of shareholder wealth. 2 26
222 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (stating
that board has fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise,
including stockholders from harm reasonably perceived); see also Towers, supra note 208,
at 484 (discussing basic requirements of Unocal duties).
223 See Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1545, 1563 (D.
Del. 1995) (holding target board's actions of defending against hostile offer on grounds
that targets future profitability prospects were much greater than currently recognized by
the market, to be within range of reasonableness); Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990) ("This broad mandate includes a conferred
authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame ... Thus the question of
'long-term' versus 'short-term' values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are
obliged to charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard
to a fixed investment horizon."); Henry, supra note 98, at 1031-32 (discussing post-Time
decisions applying Delaware corporate law and stating how they allow directors to set
long term profitability goals).
224 See E. Ashton Johnston, Note, Defenders of the Corporate Bastion in the Revlon
Zone: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 155, 184-85
(1990) (summarizing Delaware Supreme Court's view on board's freedom to set
'investment horizon' prior to Revlon's invocation); Patricia A. Terian, Comment, "It's Not
Polite to Ask Questions" in the Boardroom:Van Gorkom's Due Care Standard Minimized
in Paramount v. QVC, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 887, 918 n. 210 (1996) (inferring long-term goals
may be taken into account prior to Revlon's invocation because, at that time, there is no
fear shareholders will be 'cashed out' by new controlling shareholder); Jonathan T.
Wachtel, Comment, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: A Look at Brazen v. Bell Atlantic and the
Controversy over Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 585,
617-18 (1999) (explaining board may act to protect "synergistic business combinations"
yielding long term profitability as long as its protections are not so broad as to violate
fiduciary duties owed).
225 See Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgrind'sEducation: Using Dickens
and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 799, 820-25 (1997) (emphasizing differences in court deference to business judgment
given Unocal versus Revlon duty application); Lebovitch & Morrison, supra note 166, at
38-40 (positing Revlon to be an alteration of Unocal analysis applicable only specific
factual scenarios).
226 See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250
(Del. Ch. 1989) (noting that board failed in its primary responsibility to its shareholders);
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In addition to the change in board focus, there is the limitation
on what future profitable ventures the board may take into
account when determining how to maximize shareholder
wealth. 22 7 Under Revlon, the board is prohibited from taking into
account long-term strategies for profitability and must focus
solely on maximizing the current, short-term profit that
shareholders will succumb to upon consummation of the
2 28
inevitable fundamental structural change to the corporation.
Therefore, absent invocation of Revlon, there is no concomitant
need for a fiduciary out 22 9 and its inclusion is counterintuitive. 2 30
Two main grounds for this exist. First, fiduciary-outs work to
allow a target board to walk away from a given transaction so as
to remain in line with a fiduciary duty owed. 2 3 1 Provided Revlon
has not been invoked and the target's actions are within the
bounds of Unocal, a tender offer yielding a short-term value far
in excess of the board's chosen alternative could, within the
applicable fiduciary duty's constraints, be ignored. Accordingly,
a fiduciary-out would serve no purpose in this situation other
see also Greenfield & Nilsson, supra note 225, at 820-21 (discussing changes in duties of
boards since Revlon).
227 See Gregory G. Faragasso, Note, A Policy Analysis of New York State's Security
Takeover Disclosure Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1117, 1133-34 (1988) (analyzing socioeconomic concerns created by director emphasis on short term profitability goals of
company); Henry, supra note 98, at 1026-27 (discussing conflict between investors
seeking short-term profitability and economies seeking long-term growth and
development); see also Mark David Wallace, Comment, Life in the Boardroom after
FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to Corporate Governance in Insured Depository
Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1301 (1992) (noting stance of Delaware Supreme
Court on director long-term corporate profitability strategies during Unocal).
228 See Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250 (noting that board's main concern and responsibility
is to its shareholders); see also Greenfield & Nilsson, supra note 225, at 821 (stating that
emphasis is on interests of shareholders according to Revlon).
229 See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that
corporations are limited in ways to combat perceived threats); Arons, supra note 11, at
126 (deeming Delaware Supreme Court's requirement of fiduciary out in circumstances
such as Omnicare to be redundant); Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of
Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 569,
586-95 (2004) (discussing in depth Delaware Supreme Court's authority in Omnicare for
a blanket fiduciary out requirement and concluding "the doctrinal authority cited in
Omnicare... does not compel the majority's inflexible rule against precommitment").
230 See Griffith, supra note 229, at 570-72 (discussing Delaware Supreme Court's
rejection of long established Delaware case law outlining board of director fiduciary duty);
see also Tarik J. Haskins, Comment, Look Who's Talking: Exploring No-Talk Provisionsin
Merger Agreements, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1369, 1382-83 (2002) (defining Unocal/Unitrin
standard).
231 See James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law
Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 321-25 (2001) (discussing "fiduciary outs"
and addressing court treatment of provisions); Haskins, supra note 230, at 1373 (defining
"fiduciary out" in context of merger agreements).
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than to increase negotiating costs and decrease the number of
successful agreements. Second, requiring a fiduciary out be
placed by a target into a merger agreement assumes that target
directors are always under a duty to obtain the tender offer
yielding the highest short term return to shareholders. 2 3 2 A duty
of this sort, however, is patently incorrect. Such a duty would
prevent boards from taking into account long-term plans for
profitability and, thus, destroy the power granted to the board by
Unocal to exercise its business judgment in protecting the
corporate enterprise's long-term life.233
As mentioned earlier, the fundamental change in corporate
control that threatens a shareholders ability to share in the
board of directors' long term profit-seeking plans is what invokes
Revlon's heightened scrutiny. 2 34 Plans to change corporate
control, to abandon long term profit seeking strategies in
response to a bidder's offer to break up the company, and to selfinitiate an auction to sell or break up the company, each have in
common the ability to divest shareholders from the fruits of
future corporate pursuit. 23 5 This threat, however, fails to exist
232 Boards entering into business transactions that do not change the corporation's
control structure are governed by the guidelines set out under Unocal. See Unocal v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Simply put, these guidelines only require
the board to act in good faith and in the best interests of the "corporate enterprise." Id.
While in this situation, the board has the authority to protect the corporate enterprise by
reasonable, non-draconian means. Id. Requiring a fiduciary out is not consonant with this
analysis. Id. During Unocal's application, a board is attempting to protect the "corporate
enterprise," not just the shareholders, from impending harm. Id. Taking away the board's
ability in all circumstances to acquire the requisite shareholder vote on an accelerated
basis diminishes the board's ability to bargain and, consequently, to protect the corporate
enterprise. See Griffith, supra note 229, at 613-14.
233 See Griffith, supra note 229, at 595-96 (noting Omnicare decision prevents boards
from entering into business transactions on terms providing degree of certainty); see also
Justin W. Oravetz, Comment, Is a Merger Agreement Ever Certain? The Impact of the
Omnicare Decision on Deal Protection Devices, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 805, 845 (2004)
(explaining that broad interpretation of Omnicare decision makes adoption of provisions
intended to deliver transactional certainty futile).
234 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1990) (explaining and expanding upon Revlon's application); see also MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250-51 (Del. Ch. 1989) (discussing
duties owed by and rules governing directors in transactions that involve change in
corporation's control structure).
235 See QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1266-67 (Del.
Ch. 1993) (describing sale of corporation's control and noting shareholders could be cashed
out at any time); Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250-51 (describing situation of 'break up' of
corporation and noting subsequent, concomitant change in corporation's control
structure); see also Cannon & Tangney, supra note 179, at 750 (juxtaposing change of
control situations with non-change of control situations).
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prior to Revlon's invocation. 23 6 Ownership at any time prior to
Revlon's invocation exists in either a "fluid aggregation of
unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting majority - in
other words, in the market"2 3 7 or in such other way that power
distributed among shareholders. 23 8
consistently
remains
Therefore, it is contrary to established principles regarding
observance of business judgment to allow shareholders to force
the. board, inconsistent with the fiduciary duty it owes, to
abandon long term goals in favor of maximizing short term
shareholder wealth. 2 3 9 As such, the mandatory inclusion of
fiduciary outs, regardless of the circumstances, is without
reason.

2 40

CONCLUSION

So long as boards act within the duties owed by them at any
given time, courts must respect their business judgment in
choosing to take the less traveled of two divergent roads. This
comment suggests that the Omnicare court, by holding preclusive
and coercive the combination of, one, board action forcing a
decision on whether to merge be sent to the shareholders and,
236 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del.
1990) (holding that change of control, not merely adoption of structural defensive devices,
is necessary to trigger Revlon); Cannon & Tangney, supra note 179, at 750 (explaining
that when two corporations have such widely held shares that neither is controlled by a
particular group "the ability of individual shareholders to affect the decision-making of
the merged entity is functionally equivalent to their ability to affect the premerger
entities," and no change in control triggers Revlon).
237 Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (quoting Chancellor's decision in lower court).
238 See Kahan, supra note 166, at 595 (explicating conflict of interest non-existent
when control does not shift yet very prevalent when control does shift in business
transactions); Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically Altered States: Entering the 'Revlon
Zone", 90 COLUM. L. REV. 760, 779-80 (1990) (providing examples of when control does
and does not change significantly enough to invoke Revlon).
239 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) (reaffirming
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Time to allow board of directors to deem
corporation's market price to under value the corporation's long-term value); Dennis
Honabach & Roger Dennis, Symposium on the Seventh Circuit as a Commercial Court:
The Seventh Circuit and the Market for Corporate Control, 65 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 681, 699
n. 108 (1989) (emphasizing Delaware Supreme Court's stance on allowing board's to take
into account 'preconceived long range corporate plans' and positing board authority to be
largely increased by power to defend against unsolicited offers by claiming its
preconceived plan to be more valuable).
240 See Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 990 (1993) (arguing that Revlon duty is too
strict); Rinaldi, supra note 238, at 762-63 (stating that duty imposed on directors by
Revlon is radical and allows little discretion compared with business judgment rule or
Unocal standard).
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two, shareholder action granting voting agreements to a merger
candidate, erred in its application of Unocal and its progeny. In
addition, this comment suggests that the Omnicare court, by
holding fiduciary outs to be an indispensable prerequisite of
board action taken in furtherance of business combinations,
erred in its analysis of Unocal and Revlon, as well as both their
progeny. The Court's holding in Omnicare undermines nearly
twenty years of established case law regarding duties owed by
boards of directors during business combinations and changes of
corporate control. 24 1 In the words of Justice Moore, "Corporate
law is not static, but must grow and respond to evolving concepts
and needs."2 42 Radical departure from established history,
however, presents a formidable problem.

241 See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 943 (Del. 2003)
(Veasey, J., dissenting) (stating that new rule created by majority is "unwise extension of
existing precedent"); Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 950 (Steele, J., dissenting) (criticizing
"inflexible" rule created by majority); see also Griffith, supra note 229, at 623 (positing
that Omnicarerule is "bad law, bad economics, and bad policy").
242 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (quoting
Justice Moore's reasoning in Unocal); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351
(Del. 1985) (reiterating Justice Moore's statement in Unocal).

